Polen, presidentvalet och EU - anmälningslänk: https://simplesignup.se/event/171834-internationell-utblick-polen-efter-presidentvalet
Måndag 21 september kl 18.00 Polen, presidentvalet och EU. Medverkan av Stefan Ingvarsson, översättare, kulturskribent med mera, Mika Larsson, journalist och författare, Kasia Sysy, filmkritiker och kulturjournalist, Maciej Zaremba, journalist och författare och Olof Kleberg, journalist, samtalsledare.
Partiet Lag och Rättvisa, PiS, har befäst sin politiska ledarposition i Polen genom att dess kandidat Andrzej Duda segrade i andra omgången av presidentvalet i somras. Polen under PiSs styre har kritiserats för inskränkningar i pressfriheten, genom att tillsätta lojala chefer och journalister i etermedia och avskeda för regimen misshagliga motsvarigheter. Dessutom har oberoende domare avsatts och ersatts av lojala personer. Ledningen för kulturella institutioner har bytts ut. En likriktning har också skett vid andra utnämningar inom statsförvaltningen.
Fria val hålls ännu, men demokratin har beskurits och det styrande regeringspartiet otillbörligt gynnats.
EU har uttryckt sitt ogillande över utvecklingen i Polen, men inte vidtagit åtgärder för att bestraffa landet politiskt eller ekonomiskt.
Hur kan det aktuella läget i Polen, nu och inför den närmaste framtiden beskrivas? Vad kan oppositionen och civilsamhället göra i Polen? Hur bör omvärlden, EU och Sverige reagera på den rådande utvecklingen i landet?
Fri entré.
ABF Stockholm OSSE-nätverket
Sällskapet för Studier av Ryssland, Central- och Östeuropa samt Centralasien
Partiet Lag och Rättvisa, PiS, har befäst sin politiska ledarposition i Polen genom att dess kandidat Andrzej Duda segrade i andra omgången av presidentvalet i somras. Polen under PiSs styre har kritiserats för inskränkningar i pressfriheten, genom att tillsätta lojala chefer och journalister i etermedia och avskeda för regimen misshagliga motsvarigheter. Dessutom har oberoende domare avsatts och ersatts av lojala personer. Ledningen för kulturella institutioner har bytts ut. En likriktning har också skett vid andra utnämningar inom statsförvaltningen.
Fria val hålls ännu, men demokratin har beskurits och det styrande regeringspartiet otillbörligt gynnats.
EU har uttryckt sitt ogillande över utvecklingen i Polen, men inte vidtagit åtgärder för att bestraffa landet politiskt eller ekonomiskt.
Hur kan det aktuella läget i Polen, nu och inför den närmaste framtiden beskrivas? Vad kan oppositionen och civilsamhället göra i Polen? Hur bör omvärlden, EU och Sverige reagera på den rådande utvecklingen i landet?
Fri entré.
ABF Stockholm OSSE-nätverket
Sällskapet för Studier av Ryssland, Central- och Östeuropa samt Centralasien
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Ordförandebrev om krisen i OSSE
Stockholm 2020-07-31
Hej alla medlemmar i OSSE-nätverket,
OSSE är i ledningskris. De fyra topptjänstemännen har inte fått förlängda mandat och tvingats avgå. Krisen är djupare än så. Den kan ses som toppen på ett isberg av svårigheter och komplicerade politiska motsättningar.
Kort före det att Sverige häromveckan presenterade sina prioriteringar inför ordförandeskapet 2021 (se https://www.ossenatverket.org/) sade ett antal medlemsländer - Azerbajdzjan, Tadzjikistan och Turkiet - nej till att förlänga mandaten för organisationens två av organisationens topptjänster med inriktning på rättighetsfrågor. Som reaktion valde då flera ”västländer” att blockera förlängningen av samtliga fyra topptjänster (inkl generalsekreteraren) bl. a med motiveringen att de fyra existerande tjänsterna var ett balanserat sammanhållet “paket”. Stora länder som Ryssland och USA och andra valde att hålla en låg profil – men har i vissa fall varit aktiva i bakgrunden.
De fyra topptjänstemännen är nu tillfälligt ersatta av sina närmaste medarbetare. Albanien som är ordförandeland 2020 har uppgiften att hålla i arbetet att få ihop ett förslag till ny ordinarie generalsekreterare och nya institutionschefer att utses vid det sedvanliga utrikesministermötet i december.
Risken för att man i december än en gång kommer att bli tvungen att “stoppa klockan “under pågående ministermöte är uppenbar. Mycket hänger på om de största länderna och EU anser OSSE viktigt nog för att aktivt utöva press på de länder som liksom tidigare motsätter sig OSSE:s arbete med demokrati, mänskliga rättigheter, minoritetsfrågor och inte minst söker motverka deltagande från civilsamhället i OSSEs möten.
Den här dramatiska utvecklingen i OSSE har i Sverige hamnat helt i medieskugga, men nätverket försöker löpande informera på vår hemsida https://www.ossenatverket.org/ och på vårt twitterkonto @ossenatverket.
När mandaten för de fyra nu skulle förlängas gavs ett tillfälle att säga nej, framförallt till mandaten för ODIHR-chefen och representanten för mediefrihet (RoFM). Motståndet ansågs inte vara riktat mot personerna som sådana utan mot deras mandat. Ordförandeskapet (Albanien) försökte hitta en lösning genom att med stöd av många andra länder föreslå att mandaten ”tekniskt” skulle förlängas ett år genom ett ”paketbeslut” som omfattade alla fyra posterna.
Men efter hårda förhandlingar blockerades paketförslaget på två punkter (ODIHR och RoFM) av Azerbajdzjan, Tadzjikistan och Turkiet, samtidigt som flera andra länder motsatte sig att bryta upp “paketet”. Beslutet kräver enhällighet. Ordförandeskapet tvingades då att lägga fram förslag om fyra tillförordnade chefer från respektive institution. Efter fortsatta intensiva förhandlingar godkändes dessa förslag fredag 17 juli och bytet på posterna ägde rum dagen efter (18/7) .
Det hävdas att de tre motståndsländerna fått diskret stöd av Ryssland men också av vissa EU-länder (som Ungern och Polen). Att ett relativt litet och svagt land som Albanien innehar ordförandeskapet har inte stärkt ledarskapet för organisationen - i synnerhet som några av de större/starkare medlemsstaterna nu inte tillräckligt starkt prioriterat OSSE-krisen bland andra internationella frågor. Eftersom uppdragsbeskrivningarna i mandaten för medierepresentanten (RoFM) och minoritetskommissarien (HCNM) är personliga för innehavaren gäller de inte för de tillförordnade cheferna mer än rent tekniskt. De två andra tillfälliga cheferna (tf generalsekreterare och tf chef för ODIHR) får naturligtvis också en svag ställning. Effektiviteten i de tillförordnades diplomatiska verksamhet och besluten i Permanenta Rådet begränsas därför betydligt.
Närmast kommer det årliga OSSE-mötet om den "mänskliga dimensionen" (HDIM) i Warszawa i september att negativt påverkas av den här ledningskrisen, utöver problemet att det i år sannolikt inte kan hållas ett fysiskt möte på grund av coronakrisen. Eventuellt kommer därför mötet att bli inställt vilket är allvarligt med hänsyn till betydelsen av HDIM för att återkommande behandla grundläggande demokrati- och MR-frågor inom OSSE-regionen. Varje sådan förändring av praxis blir svår att återställa.
Det är rimligt att förutsätta att det vid ministerrådet i december kommer att göras nya intensiva försök att försvaga de nya mandaten, framförallt för ODIHR och RoFM, för dem som då ska väljas till nya befattningshavare. Det går inte att utesluta att motsättningarna är så stora att inga nya ordinarie chefer kan utses i december och att frågan då förs till det svenska ordförandeskapet 2021 (och ett extra ministerrådsmöte).
Senast OSSE stod inför liknande utmaningar var för tio år sedan vid toppmötet i Astana 2010. Då kunde en enad ”västvärld” ledd av EU säga till värdlandet Kazachstan att utan ett slutdokument som bekräftade tidigare OSSE-åtaganden skulle det inte bli något slutdokument över huvud taget. Den dåvarande ryske presidenten Medvedev och hans allierade valde då att inte sätta hårt mot hårt.
Bakgrunden ska, som jag ser det efter kontakter både i Wien, med det europeiska civilsamhället och på svenska UD, sökas i en djup motsättning när de fyra topptjänsterna tillsattes 2017 för en period av tre år. Alla fyra som då valdes var från "västländer" (Italien, Frankrike, Island och Schweiz, varav tre NATO-medlemmar). Det har bidragit till en ny “öst-väst “-maktpolitisk spänning inom OSSE. Men egentligen rör det sig om en ännu djupare underliggande principiellt politisk multipolär motsättning om mandaten för de tre särskilda institutionerna inom OSSE. Några länder anser att mandaten går alldeles för långt vad gäller demokrati/MR/rättsstatsprinciper och inblandning i staternas "inre angelägenheter." Dessa länder anser också att civilsamhället har en alldeles för stark ställning i OSSE-arbetet. Det är ingen hemlighet att det har under en längre tid i första hand rört sig om vissa länder i OSSE:s sydöstra regioner. Men länderkretsen har på senare år vidgats till andra regioner. Den ändrade amerikanska utrikespolitiken under president Trump sätter också sina spår. Kina gränsar till OSSE regionens östra delar och har med sina ökade geopolitiska ekonomiska och politiska ambitioner markerat avsevärda intressen för OSSE.
Den här gången får därför förutsättningarna för en överenskommelse ses som långt sämre. Tidigare valde de länder som ogillar uppmärksamheten på MR-frågor att trots allt hålla kvar OSSE för att främja sina säkerhetspolitiska intressen och ha en oberoende röst i en organisation som styrs av enhällighetsprincipen. Idag är den säkerhetspolitiska bilden betydligt mer splittrad och komplicerad. Det gäller både inställningen till demokrati (exempelvis i den nya högerpopulismen och “auktoritarismen”) och till rättsstaten. Men det gäller också storpolitiska maktpolitiska motsättningar. Sammanhållningen inom EU är bräcklig, den transatlantiska länken försvagad och synen på internationellt samarbete mer splittrad. Rysslands och Kinas (och Turkiets) politiska ambitioner vad avser OSSE är osäkra. Till råga på allt går USA i höst till ett presidentval där utgången är oviss och följderna osäkra.
Det gäller nu att övertyga alla - inte minst mindre länder i OSSE:s periferi - att ministerrådsmötet i december kan bli ändhållplatsen för dem som vill ha ett internationellt erkännande av sin suveränitet utöver medlemskapet i FN. Det kommer att kräva en ytterst aktiv diplomati och betydande informationsinsatser från svensk sida. Med svenska utgångspunkter gäller det att försvara och förklara betydelsen av folkrätten och multilateralt samarbete och innebörden av “bred säkerhet”. Det råder ingen tvekan om att utan ett OSSE kommer samarbetet mellan EU och många länder i öster också försvåras, sannolikt med avsevärda ekonomiska konsekvenser.
Sammanfattningsvis är stämningen inom OSSE för närvarande mycket dålig och full av motsättningar. Detta förhållande kan sägas avspegla det internationella säkerhetspolitiska läget i stort. Det är särskilt allvarligt när en organisation som OSSE med sitt breda säkerhetsbegrepp och omfattande medlemskap behövs extra mycket.
Läget lägger en extra börda på Sverige och det kommande svenska OSSE-ordförandeskapet. Uppgiften sträcker sig också till vårt samarbete inom EU och till medlemskapet i FN. Efter Albanien 2020 och före Polen 2022 finns stora förväntningar på Sverige 2021. Men det ställer även krav på civilsamhällena och deras organisationer inom OSSE-regionen inklusive vårt eget OSSE-nätverk.
Från OSSE-nätverkets perspektiv kan slutligen enkelt men brutalt uttryckt sägas att civilsamhället står som så många gånger tidigare inför situationen att ju hårdare man driver kampanjen att försvara OSSE:s åtaganden och principer desto svårare blir det att åstadkomma en överenskommelse på politisk nivå. Just de företrädare för civilsamhället som vi värnar om i kritiska länder stigmatiseras ofta av dessa länders ledningar som terrorister. Som inkommande ordförande måste Sverige hålla en diskret offentlig profil. Men det gäller då för civilsamhället inkl Nätverket att informera brett om att hela frågan om OSSE och dess framtid gäller ländernas ställning - små som stora - som självständiga stater och deras nationella säkerhet, med allt vad det betyder också när det gäller mänsklig säkerhet som miljö, hälsa, ekonomisk och social utveckling för de enskilda medborgarna.
Styrelsen för OSSE-nätverket fortsätter att löpande följa frågan utöver det arbete vi ägnar förberedelserna av det svenska ordförandeåret 2021 i övrigt och civilsamhällets roll i detta. Om inte förr kommer det att krävas ett aktivt engagemang av våra medlemsorganisationer och enskilda medlemmar. Jag uppmuntrar alla idéer om hur detta skall kunna åstadkommas.
Ha mitt i allt detta en god sommar med vederbörlig distans,
Anders Bjurner
Ordförande
Välkommen till vår hemsida
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KALENDARIUMProgramläggningen avvaktar corona-utvecklingen.
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Följ med i rapporteringen på Twitter om OSSE:s olika dimensioner på vårt eget twitterkonto
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RAPPORTER OCH DOKUMENT FRÅN TIDIGARE EVENEMANG
Klicka nedan för rapport från vårt senaste seminarium:
BRATISLAVA CSP BELARUS VALET ÖSTERSJÖSEMINARIUM HDIM I WARSZAWA
Ett brev till hemsidan:
Dear friends,
tomorrow, it's been 10 years since the violent clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in Osh and Jalalabad, broke out.
I've written this op-ed in The Diplomat Magazine, where I particularly raise the situation for Azimzhan Askarov.
Please help spread the article and its main message - that it's time to Free Askarov.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/justice-and-the-june-events-looking-back-at-kyrgyzstans-2010-troubles/
All the best,
Ivar
Dear friends,
tomorrow, it's been 10 years since the violent clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in Osh and Jalalabad, broke out.
I've written this op-ed in The Diplomat Magazine, where I particularly raise the situation for Azimzhan Askarov.
Please help spread the article and its main message - that it's time to Free Askarov.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/justice-and-the-june-events-looking-back-at-kyrgyzstans-2010-troubles/
All the best,
Ivar
APPELLER SOM STÖDS AV OSSE-NÄTVERKET
Civic Solidarity Platform statement
U.S. racism and police violence and the human dimension heritage of the OSCE
The undersigned organizations, members of the Civic Solidarity Platform, express their concern regarding the United States government’s response to widespread peaceful protests against police violence. The protests, begun in response to an extrajudicial killing of a citizen by a police officer, have been largely peaceful and law-abiding. In response, police officers have repeatedly escalated encounters with protesters and used unwarranted violence. Police departments have applied military gear and tanks more appropriate for war than for calming a civilian demonstration. And the President of the United States has urged state governors to increase violent responses, and expressed his intent to call in active duty military soldiers. The state response, which has threatened peaceful civilians and journalists, violates international standards on the use of force and policing of assemblies and OSCE commitments and guidance by OSCE bodies. A central document in this guidance are the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly issued by OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Key provisions from this document form the core of the Civic Solidarity Platform’s Bratislava Declaration of December 2019, which called on OSCE participating states to review their compliance with these standards, and to strengthen ODIHR’s monitoring and advisory activities relating to the right to peaceful assembly.
The demonstrations began with the killing on 25 May of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer. The incident occurred while many civil society organizations and governments gathered for an OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on “Addressing All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination”. Participants were unable to bring attention to the issue at the meeting, but the legitimate passion of these demonstrations should be addressed through all possible means by all OSCE interlocutors with the United States government. Endemic racism, inequality, and racially-motivated violence should be confronted by all those in positions of authority in the US.
As we noted in the Bratislava Declaration: “Assemblies contribute to conflict prevention and peace.” It is well established that neither the use of violence by a small number of people nor damage to property suspend the right to protest of all those gathered and do not provide a license to escalate police responses or to use excessive or deadly force In all circumstances, the police response must remain within the limits of the law and seek to de-escalate rather than inflame interactions with the public by resorting to life-threatening weapons.
The far-reaching militarization of the police, both in equipment and approach, should be questioned fundamentally. The deployment of almost 80,000 National Guard soldiers, including more than 37,400 taking part in COVID-19 response efforts and more than 41,500 on duty in 33 states and Washington, D.C., in response to civil unrest. President Donald Trump’s exhortations for greater use of violence on social media and in a phone conversation with state governors, and his threat to deploy federal armed forces against protestors only place more lives at risk.
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media has already expressed his concern regarding “the wave of violence against journalists covering protests. (...) Many of these incidents involved arrests and use of force by police, including rubber bullets, pepper bullets, tear gas and pepper spray, as well as acts of violence by protesters,” In many instances it appeared police knowingly used violence against journalists without justification. The OSCE Representative called on the authorities “to exercise restraint and to ensure that journalists can work safely while reporting on public protests.”
We call on all those within the OSCE, its independent institutions and all participating states to urge relevant U.S. authorities to utilize the OSCE’s 30 years of experience in advising states on effective and community-oriented policing practices, in the management of assemblies, and in redressing fundamental and deep-rooted ethnic inequalities. This includes the ODIHR, the expertise of NGOs in member states, and the experience of fellow OSCE participating state governments. We also call on the government of the United States to observe OSCE standards and human rights norms it has agreed to uphold.
Demonstrations in solidarity with the U.S. protestors against systemic racism and violent and one-sided policing practices are being held in a range of OSCE countries. These protests have started to also call attention to the state of affairs on these issues in their own countries. We call on all OSCE participating states to engage in a profound debate about these demands, taking into consideration conclusions and recommendations from international review bodies such as the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
U.S. racism and police violence and the human dimension heritage of the OSCE
The undersigned organizations, members of the Civic Solidarity Platform, express their concern regarding the United States government’s response to widespread peaceful protests against police violence. The protests, begun in response to an extrajudicial killing of a citizen by a police officer, have been largely peaceful and law-abiding. In response, police officers have repeatedly escalated encounters with protesters and used unwarranted violence. Police departments have applied military gear and tanks more appropriate for war than for calming a civilian demonstration. And the President of the United States has urged state governors to increase violent responses, and expressed his intent to call in active duty military soldiers. The state response, which has threatened peaceful civilians and journalists, violates international standards on the use of force and policing of assemblies and OSCE commitments and guidance by OSCE bodies. A central document in this guidance are the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly issued by OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. Key provisions from this document form the core of the Civic Solidarity Platform’s Bratislava Declaration of December 2019, which called on OSCE participating states to review their compliance with these standards, and to strengthen ODIHR’s monitoring and advisory activities relating to the right to peaceful assembly.
The demonstrations began with the killing on 25 May of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer. The incident occurred while many civil society organizations and governments gathered for an OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on “Addressing All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination”. Participants were unable to bring attention to the issue at the meeting, but the legitimate passion of these demonstrations should be addressed through all possible means by all OSCE interlocutors with the United States government. Endemic racism, inequality, and racially-motivated violence should be confronted by all those in positions of authority in the US.
As we noted in the Bratislava Declaration: “Assemblies contribute to conflict prevention and peace.” It is well established that neither the use of violence by a small number of people nor damage to property suspend the right to protest of all those gathered and do not provide a license to escalate police responses or to use excessive or deadly force In all circumstances, the police response must remain within the limits of the law and seek to de-escalate rather than inflame interactions with the public by resorting to life-threatening weapons.
The far-reaching militarization of the police, both in equipment and approach, should be questioned fundamentally. The deployment of almost 80,000 National Guard soldiers, including more than 37,400 taking part in COVID-19 response efforts and more than 41,500 on duty in 33 states and Washington, D.C., in response to civil unrest. President Donald Trump’s exhortations for greater use of violence on social media and in a phone conversation with state governors, and his threat to deploy federal armed forces against protestors only place more lives at risk.
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media has already expressed his concern regarding “the wave of violence against journalists covering protests. (...) Many of these incidents involved arrests and use of force by police, including rubber bullets, pepper bullets, tear gas and pepper spray, as well as acts of violence by protesters,” In many instances it appeared police knowingly used violence against journalists without justification. The OSCE Representative called on the authorities “to exercise restraint and to ensure that journalists can work safely while reporting on public protests.”
We call on all those within the OSCE, its independent institutions and all participating states to urge relevant U.S. authorities to utilize the OSCE’s 30 years of experience in advising states on effective and community-oriented policing practices, in the management of assemblies, and in redressing fundamental and deep-rooted ethnic inequalities. This includes the ODIHR, the expertise of NGOs in member states, and the experience of fellow OSCE participating state governments. We also call on the government of the United States to observe OSCE standards and human rights norms it has agreed to uphold.
Demonstrations in solidarity with the U.S. protestors against systemic racism and violent and one-sided policing practices are being held in a range of OSCE countries. These protests have started to also call attention to the state of affairs on these issues in their own countries. We call on all OSCE participating states to engage in a profound debate about these demands, taking into consideration conclusions and recommendations from international review bodies such as the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
Framgång för CSP-appell i Azerbaidjan!
First time since the Khyruschov's Thaw, the domestic court acquitted the former political prisoners... Supreme Court Acquits Ilgar Mammadov and Rasul Jafarov
2020 April 23 ( Thursday ) 12:54:40
Baku / 23.04.20 / Turan: The Plenum of the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan issued an acquittal in relation to the previously convicted leader of the REAL Party Ilgar Mammadov and the human rights activist Rasul Jafarov.
The plenum overturned the verdicts handed down earlier, finding their guilt unproven and acquitted both.
At the same time, the court decided to pay 57,400 manats to Jafarov for moral damage, and 234,000 manats to Mammadov.
Recall that Ilgar Mammadov was sentenced to 7 years in prison "for organizing unrest" in the city of Ismayilli in January 2013. International organizations recognized Mammadov as a political prisoner.
The European Court of Human Rights issued several decisions in the Mammadov case, finding his arrest and imprisonment unreasonable. The structures of the Council of Europe and PACE repeatedly called for the release of Mammadov and cancellation of all the charges against him. However, the Azerbaijani authorities ignored these demands for many years. Only in 2018 he was released on parole, but the charges were not dropped from him.
Similar decisions were made by the European Court of Human Rights in the Rasul Jafarov case and were also ignored by the Azerbaijani government. Recognized by the international community as a political prisoner, Jafarov was convicted in 2014 of abuse of power, forgery and embezzlement, and tax evasion. Two years later, he was pardoned, but the charges were not dropped from him, despite the decisions of the European Court.
Commenting on the decision of the Supreme Court for Turan News Agency today, Mammadov called it “a great victory and an important event in the judicial system of Azerbaijan.”
Rasul Jafarov also did not conceal his satisfaction with the fact that the decision of the European Court, even with a delay, was implemented. http://www.contact.az/ext/news/2020/4/free/politics%20news/en/123460.htm
Call to Release Pre-Trial Detainees in Turkey
17 April 2020
This statement calls for reduction of pre-trial detention in Turkey and for the use of alternatives to detention, in order to reduce the danger of outbreaks of the COVID-19 disease, as a safety measure for the health and wellbeing of the penitentiary staff and detainees, and to avoid disproportionate isolation procedures inside prisons. Current orders for pre-trial detention should be revoked, and judges should resort to alternative measures for judicial control when necessary. Similarly, for new arrestees, pre-trial detention should be avoided.
The developing COVID-19 crisis is making measures countering the possible outbreak of the virus in any places of detention an urgent priority. The World Health Organization has indicated that “the risk of rapidly increasing transmission of the disease within prisons or other places of detention is likely to have an amplifying effect on the epidemic, swiftly multiplying the number of people affected.” In other words, “efforts to control COVID-19 in the community are likely to fail if strong (…) measures are not carried out in prisons as well.” Releasing persons behind bars without discrimination is one of the measures recommended by international bodies as an important step to lowering the risks of outbreaks. Other measures commonly used in fighting COVID-19, such as distancing and quarantining, are close to impossible to implement in places of detention or may have very significant negative side-effects. Hence the emphasis should be on limiting the number of persons in detention.
While the government was already preparing the Third Judicial Reform Package tackling change in the Law on Execution of Sentences, a rapid submission of the bill (Ceza ve Güvenlik Tedbirlerinin İnfazı Hakkında Kanun ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Teklifi) was made to the Grand National Assembly last week. The adoption of the bill on 15 April 2020 will reduce the total number of people imprisoned by approximately one third. With Turkey’s prisons hosting approximately 294,000 people, releasing up to 90,000 prisoners will be in line with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ call for “governments and relevant authorities to work quickly to reduce the number of people in detention.” At the same time, it is disappointing, as has been expressed in a number of appeals by human rights organisations, that the measures under this law do not extend more widely and indiscriminately to all persons deprived of liberty with particular risk of the COVID-19 infection because of their age or pre-existing illnesses or conditions.
As this law only affects persons already convicted, we want to draw attention for one further category of persons behind bars: the thousands who are being held in pre-trial detention. Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and Article 109 of the Criminal Code clearly outline that judicial control should have precedence over being arrested during the investigation process. Similarly, according to international human rights standards, clarified by ECtHR judgements, the legal principle of presumption of innocence until proven guilty and the right to liberty conclude that pre-trial detention should be a matter of last resort. In the current situation, this argument becomes all the more urgent. According to information obtained from the Ministry of Justice, approximately 43% of the prison population are in pre-trial detention, so reducing the number of pre-trial detainees can make a significant contribution to alleviating the risk of outbreaks.
The (conditional) release of arrestees is only possible if a judge rules in this regard. Judges have the competence to release arrestees but keep them under judicial control, codified in Article 109 of the Criminal Code. (In the case of conditionally releasing suspects/defendants of violence against women and children, Law No. 6284 on Family Protection and the Prevention of Violence against Women (6284 sayılı Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Karşı Şiddetin Önlenmesine Dair Kanun) should be applied to avoid bringing the alleged perpetrator and victim into the same closed space, and to take all other preventive measures to protect the victim when needed.)
Keeping COVID-19 risks in mind, prosecutors’ requests to arrest should come to end; and decisions to arrest by (Sulh Ceza) judges should end. Any continuation of decisions to arrest brings with it many risks. Prosecutors and judges applying alternative measures to arrest, which are codified by judicial control provisions, are vital in the times we find ourselves in. As a matter of fact, according to an explanation provided by the Ministry of Justice, as of this week, people in prison have started passing away as a result of COVID-19. This is an indication that the pandemic has reached prisons, and it is unfortunately an indication that the situation will continuously worsen.
The Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) has delegated to courts the introduction of measures to respond to the pandemic, which includes postponing hearings. However, even if judicial proceedings and hearings of cases of detainees are not being postponed, the pandemic still leads to an increased risk to the right to life of detainees in the period in which suspects/defendants wait for their hearings. Therefore, from this perspective, taking steps to reassess detention rulings, without waiting for hearings and to employ alternatives to pre-trial detention, is important.
In line with the right to fair trial, and the principle of non-discrimination, and echoing the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), we urge judges to make all efforts to “resort to alternatives to deprivation of liberty… Authorities should make greater use of alternatives to pre-trial detention…” The undersigned organizations urge the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) to issue clear guidance to local courts that pre-trial detention should in principle be avoided in line with international law. This is a general principle that has become even more important because of the pandemic, in which all risks and violations of the right to life must be avoided.
Albanian Helsinki Committee
Amnesty International Netherlands
Association for Monitoring Equal Rights (Turkey)
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
Center for Civil Liberties (Ukraine)
Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Russia)
Centre on Drug Policy Evaluation
Citizens’ Assembly Turkey
Civic Space Studies Association (Turkey)
Civil Rights Defenders
Civil Society in the Penal System (Turkey)
Fair Trials
Foundation for Society and Legal Studies (Turkey)
Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly – Vanadzor (Armenia)
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Poland)
Human Rights Center “Viasna” (Belarus)
Human Rights Center ZMINA (Ukraine)
Human Rights Monitoring Institute (Lithuania)
Insituto RIA (Mexico)
International Drug Policy Consortium
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Legal Policy Research Centre (Kazakhstan)
Life Memory Freedom Association (Turkey)
Media and Law Studies Association (Turkey)
Netherlands Helsinki Committee
Promo-LEX Association (Moldova)
Public Association Dignity (Kazakhstan)
Public Verdict Foundation (Russia)
Punto24 Platform for Independent Journalism P24 (Turkey)
Research Institute on Turkey
Swedish OSCE Network
The Barys Zvozskau Belarusian Human Rights House
The Human Rights Movement: Bir Duino (Kyrgyzstan)
Truth Justice and Memory Center (Turkey)
Turkish-German Forum of Culture
World Organisation against Torture – OMCT
Youth RISE
17 April 2020
This statement calls for reduction of pre-trial detention in Turkey and for the use of alternatives to detention, in order to reduce the danger of outbreaks of the COVID-19 disease, as a safety measure for the health and wellbeing of the penitentiary staff and detainees, and to avoid disproportionate isolation procedures inside prisons. Current orders for pre-trial detention should be revoked, and judges should resort to alternative measures for judicial control when necessary. Similarly, for new arrestees, pre-trial detention should be avoided.
The developing COVID-19 crisis is making measures countering the possible outbreak of the virus in any places of detention an urgent priority. The World Health Organization has indicated that “the risk of rapidly increasing transmission of the disease within prisons or other places of detention is likely to have an amplifying effect on the epidemic, swiftly multiplying the number of people affected.” In other words, “efforts to control COVID-19 in the community are likely to fail if strong (…) measures are not carried out in prisons as well.” Releasing persons behind bars without discrimination is one of the measures recommended by international bodies as an important step to lowering the risks of outbreaks. Other measures commonly used in fighting COVID-19, such as distancing and quarantining, are close to impossible to implement in places of detention or may have very significant negative side-effects. Hence the emphasis should be on limiting the number of persons in detention.
While the government was already preparing the Third Judicial Reform Package tackling change in the Law on Execution of Sentences, a rapid submission of the bill (Ceza ve Güvenlik Tedbirlerinin İnfazı Hakkında Kanun ile Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Teklifi) was made to the Grand National Assembly last week. The adoption of the bill on 15 April 2020 will reduce the total number of people imprisoned by approximately one third. With Turkey’s prisons hosting approximately 294,000 people, releasing up to 90,000 prisoners will be in line with UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ call for “governments and relevant authorities to work quickly to reduce the number of people in detention.” At the same time, it is disappointing, as has been expressed in a number of appeals by human rights organisations, that the measures under this law do not extend more widely and indiscriminately to all persons deprived of liberty with particular risk of the COVID-19 infection because of their age or pre-existing illnesses or conditions.
As this law only affects persons already convicted, we want to draw attention for one further category of persons behind bars: the thousands who are being held in pre-trial detention. Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and Article 109 of the Criminal Code clearly outline that judicial control should have precedence over being arrested during the investigation process. Similarly, according to international human rights standards, clarified by ECtHR judgements, the legal principle of presumption of innocence until proven guilty and the right to liberty conclude that pre-trial detention should be a matter of last resort. In the current situation, this argument becomes all the more urgent. According to information obtained from the Ministry of Justice, approximately 43% of the prison population are in pre-trial detention, so reducing the number of pre-trial detainees can make a significant contribution to alleviating the risk of outbreaks.
The (conditional) release of arrestees is only possible if a judge rules in this regard. Judges have the competence to release arrestees but keep them under judicial control, codified in Article 109 of the Criminal Code. (In the case of conditionally releasing suspects/defendants of violence against women and children, Law No. 6284 on Family Protection and the Prevention of Violence against Women (6284 sayılı Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Karşı Şiddetin Önlenmesine Dair Kanun) should be applied to avoid bringing the alleged perpetrator and victim into the same closed space, and to take all other preventive measures to protect the victim when needed.)
Keeping COVID-19 risks in mind, prosecutors’ requests to arrest should come to end; and decisions to arrest by (Sulh Ceza) judges should end. Any continuation of decisions to arrest brings with it many risks. Prosecutors and judges applying alternative measures to arrest, which are codified by judicial control provisions, are vital in the times we find ourselves in. As a matter of fact, according to an explanation provided by the Ministry of Justice, as of this week, people in prison have started passing away as a result of COVID-19. This is an indication that the pandemic has reached prisons, and it is unfortunately an indication that the situation will continuously worsen.
The Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) has delegated to courts the introduction of measures to respond to the pandemic, which includes postponing hearings. However, even if judicial proceedings and hearings of cases of detainees are not being postponed, the pandemic still leads to an increased risk to the right to life of detainees in the period in which suspects/defendants wait for their hearings. Therefore, from this perspective, taking steps to reassess detention rulings, without waiting for hearings and to employ alternatives to pre-trial detention, is important.
In line with the right to fair trial, and the principle of non-discrimination, and echoing the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), we urge judges to make all efforts to “resort to alternatives to deprivation of liberty… Authorities should make greater use of alternatives to pre-trial detention…” The undersigned organizations urge the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) to issue clear guidance to local courts that pre-trial detention should in principle be avoided in line with international law. This is a general principle that has become even more important because of the pandemic, in which all risks and violations of the right to life must be avoided.
Albanian Helsinki Committee
Amnesty International Netherlands
Association for Monitoring Equal Rights (Turkey)
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
Center for Civil Liberties (Ukraine)
Center for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Russia)
Centre on Drug Policy Evaluation
Citizens’ Assembly Turkey
Civic Space Studies Association (Turkey)
Civil Rights Defenders
Civil Society in the Penal System (Turkey)
Fair Trials
Foundation for Society and Legal Studies (Turkey)
Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly – Vanadzor (Armenia)
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Poland)
Human Rights Center “Viasna” (Belarus)
Human Rights Center ZMINA (Ukraine)
Human Rights Monitoring Institute (Lithuania)
Insituto RIA (Mexico)
International Drug Policy Consortium
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Legal Policy Research Centre (Kazakhstan)
Life Memory Freedom Association (Turkey)
Media and Law Studies Association (Turkey)
Netherlands Helsinki Committee
Promo-LEX Association (Moldova)
Public Association Dignity (Kazakhstan)
Public Verdict Foundation (Russia)
Punto24 Platform for Independent Journalism P24 (Turkey)
Research Institute on Turkey
Swedish OSCE Network
The Barys Zvozskau Belarusian Human Rights House
The Human Rights Movement: Bir Duino (Kyrgyzstan)
Truth Justice and Memory Center (Turkey)
Turkish-German Forum of Culture
World Organisation against Torture – OMCT
Youth RISE
LÄNKAR TILL OSSE
SVENSKA OFFICIELLA LÄNKAR
OSSE-NYHETER PÅ TWITTER FRÅN OSSE-nätverket och SVENSKA OSSE-DELEGATIONEN I WIEN
